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252 PEOPLE V. HAEUSSLER [41 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 5391. In Bank. July 7, 1953.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. MARION JOAN 
HAEUSSLER, Appellant. 
[1] Witnesses-Self-incrimination.-Object of constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination is employment of legal process 
to extract from person's own lips an admission of his guilt 
which will take place of other evidence; it is not merely any 
and every compulsion that is kernel of privilege, but testi-
monial compulsion. 
[2] Id.-Self-incrimination.-Evidence is not obtained by testi-
monial compulsion where it consists of a test of blood taken 
from an accused; it is not a communication from the accused 
but real evidence of ultimate fact in issue, namely, his physical 
condition. 
[3] Id.-Self-incrimination.-Real evidence obtained from de-
fendant's stomach by use of an emetic is not violative of 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
[4] Criminal Law-Evidence-Evidence Wrongfully Obtained.-
Competent evidence, although improperly obtained, is ad-
missible in criminal prosecution against person from whom 
evidence is taken. 
[5] !d.-Rights of Accused-Due Process of Law.-The taking of 
a blood test, when accomplished in a medically approved man-
ner, does not smack of brutality, and where the accused was 
unconscious at time that blood was withdrawn, and removal of 
4 cubic centimeters was necessary to provide medical treat-
ment, the removal of an additional cubic centimeter of blood 
after hypodermic needle already had been inserted cannot be 
characterized as shocking to conscience and does not support 
accused's claim of violation of due process of law. 
[6] Id.- Evidence- Opinion Evidence.-Where highway patrol-
man's qualifications as a witness included many years of expe-
rience in investigating traffic accidents and reporting their 
causes to his superiors, and he based his opinion as to the 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 17; Am.Jur., Witnesses,§ 36 et seq. 
[ 4] Evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure, note 3, 24 
A.L.R. 1408; 32 A.L.R. 408 ; 41 A.L.R. 1145; 52 A.L.R. 4 77; 88 
A.L.R. 348; 150 A.L.R. 566. See, also, Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, 
§ 178; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 393 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Witnesses, § 14; [2, 3] Witnesses, 
§ 19; [4] Criminal Law, § 409; [5] Criminal Law, § 103; [6-8] 
Criminal Law, § 554; [9, 11] Automobiles, § 409(3); [10] Auto-
mobiles, § 388; [12] Homicide, § 190 ( 4). 
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point of impact upon an inspection of skid and gouge marks 
on the pavement and the location of oil, broken glass, parts of 
the vehicles and other debris, the trial court was justified in con-
cluding that a determination, from these indicia, as to point 
of impact, might properly be made by an expert. 
[7] !d.-Evidence-Opinion Evidence.-In prosecution for driving 
a vehicle while intoxicated, there was no prejudicial error in 
permitting a mechanic to testify that a severe impact might 
cause the needle of a speedometer to become fixed at any point, 
regardless of the speed at which the car had been traveling, 
where the witness was qualified as an expert by evidence that 
he had been a speedometer mechanic for several years, and no 
attempt was made by defendant to cross-examine him con-
cerning his qualifications. 
[8] !d.-Evidence-Opinion Evidence.-Generally it is for trial 
court to determine competency and qualification of a witness 
to state an opinion, and on appeal its ruling will not be dis-
turbed in absence of showing of abuse of discretion. 
[9] Automobiles-Offenses-Driving While Intoxicated-Instruc-
tions.-The degree to which a person must be influenced by 
alcohol to warrant a conviction under Veh. Code, § 501, making 
it unlawful to drive a vehicle under influence of intoxicating 
liquor, is correctly stated in an instruction that the jury need 
not find that defendant was "drunk" or "intoxicated," but that 
it would be sufficient if it were found that intoxicating liquor 
had so far affected nervous system, brain or muscles as to im-
pair to an appreciable degree ability to operate vehicle in 
manper like that of an ordinarily prudent and cautious per-
son in full possession of his faculties, using reasonable care 
and under like conditions. 
[10] !d.-Offenses-Driving While Intoxicated.~Persons may be 
"under the influence of intoxicating liquor" within the meaning 
of V eh. Code, § 501, making it an offense to drive a vehicle 
under influence of intoxicating liquor, without being af-
fected to extent commonly associated with "intoxication" or 
"drunkenness." (Disapproving Taylor v. Joyce, 4 Cal.App.2d 
612, 41 P.2d 967, and People v. Lewis, 4 Cal.App.2d (Supp.) 
775, 37 P.2d 752, to extent that they indicate a contrary 
holding.) 
[11] !d.-Offenses-Driving While Intoxicated-Instructions.-In 
prosecution for driving a vehicle while intoxicated, an in-
struction that defendant was under influence of intoxicating 
[10] Degree or nature of intoxication for purpose of statute or 
ordinance making it a criminal offense to operate an automobile 
while in that e•ondition, note, 142 A.L.R. 555. See, also, Cal.Jur.2d, 
Automobiles, § 454 et seq.; Am.Jur., Automobiles, § 767 et seq. 
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liquor if, having consumed alcoholic liquor in any amount what-
soever, she was so affected that she acted differently from an 
ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances, could 
not have confused the jury where instruction was prefaced 
with words relating to driving of vehicle and preceded by an 
instruction stating that her ability to operate vehicle must 
have been impaired. 
[12] Homicide-Instructions-Manslaughter.-In prosecution for 
manslaughter in the driving of a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 192, 
subd. 3), it is not error to fail to instruct the jury that de-
fendant should be acquitted if accident were unavoidable or 
if it were found that accident was caused solely by decedent's 
negligence, where jurors were told that, to convict defendant, 
they must find misconduct by her to have been cause of death 
and that occurrence of accident did not warrant an inference 
of negligence, there being no legal requirement that court ex-
pressly negative liability in event either of these contingencies 
occurred. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ven-
tura County. Walter J. Fourt, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for manslaughter and for driving an automo-
bile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Judg-
ment of conviction affirmed. 
Cornwall & W estwick for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Frank Richards, 
Deputy Attorney General, Roy A. Gustafson, District Attorney 
(Ventura), and Donald L. Benton, Deputy District Attorney, 
for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-Marion Joan Haeussler was tried before a 
jury upon charges of manslaughter in the driving of a vehicle 
(Pen. Code, § 192[3]) and of committing an unlawful act 
while driving a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor. (Veh. Code, § 501.) Following her conviction on both 
counts, the imposition of sentence was suspended and she was 
admitted to probation. By section 1237 of the Penal Code, 
~an order granting probation is a "final judgment of convic-
tion'' for the purpose of appeal. 
At about 1 a.m., a Buick convertible automobile operated 
by Mrs. Haeussler collided with a Mercury sedan driven by 
Vernon Lovelace in which Edward Amsel and Wayne Goff 
were riding. Amsel was killed and Lovelace a!1d Goff were 
injured. Mrs. Haeussler also sustained injuries. 
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'fhe accident occurred on a level highway about 20 feet 
wide with two lanes. Driving west, l.Jovelace observed the 
lights of the Buick as it came around a curve, apparently 
in the wrong lane. The car continued its course, the lights 
remaining undimmed. In an attempt to avoid a collision, he 
applied his brakes and swerved sharply to his left. Mrs. 
Haeussler's car struck the right side of the Mercury. 
An officer of the California Highway Patrol, who arrived 
at the scene of the accident a few minutes later, inspected the 
automobiles and took measurements of the skid marks on the 
pavement. At the trial and over objection, he gave his opinion 
of the point of impact as being in the westbound lane, about 
21 inches from the center line. He also testified that there 
was an odor of alcohol on Mrs. Haeussler's breath. 
The injured persons were taken to an emergency hospital. 
1'here, while Mrs. Haeussler was unconscious, an attendant 
withdrew from her arm five cubic centimeters-of blood. Four 
of these were used to type her blood for a transfusion. The 
remainder was given to a laboratory technician for analysis. 
Objections to the technician's testimony concerning his 
findings were overruled. He stated that the alcohol content 
of the blood was about .180 per cent. A medical expert testified 
that intoxication may occur when the amount of alcohol in 
the blood is between .050 and .150 per cent, but all individuals 
whose blood contains alcohol in an amount greater than the 
latter figure are unable to drive safely. According to his 
estimate, the alcohol content of Mrs. Haeussler's blood at the 
time of the accident was about .215 per cent. 
As grounds for a reversal of the judgment, Mrs. Haeussler 
claims that the admission of testimony concerning the results 
of the blood test taken without her consent deprived her of 
due process of law. Other contentions are that the trial court 
erred in permitting a mechanic to state his opinion in regard 
to the speedometer reading of one of the cars and in admitting 
the highway patrolman's opinion testimony concerning the 
point of impact. She also argues that the court erred in its 
rulings upon instructions to the jury. Finally, she asserts, 
the trial was conducted in a manner which favored the prose-
cution. 
Mrs. Haeussler bases her claim of a denial of due process 
upon Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ct. 205, 96 
L.Ed. 183, 25 A.hR.2d 1396]. In the Rochin case, the record 
showed that police officers, in search of narcotics, invaded 
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the defendant's room without a warrant. Seeing Rochin 
put two capsules into his mouth, the officers "jumped upon" 
him and attempted to remove the objects. Unsuccessful, they 
took him, handcuffed, to a hospital where, by means of a tube, 
an emetic was injected into his stomach, causing him to vomit 
the capsules. Upon analysis, they were found to contain 
morphine. 
In a trial upon the charge of unlawfully possessing nar-
cotics (Health & Saf. Code, § 11500), the capsules were the 
chief evidence against Rochin. The United States Supreme 
Court reversed the judgment of conviction, saying: "we are 
compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this 
conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious 
squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting 
crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the con-
science. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, 
the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, 
the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents-this course 
of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is 
bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods 
too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional 
differentiation." (P. 172.) 
Counsel for Mrs. Haeussler reads the Rochin decision as 
holding that any taking of evidence, by force, from the person 
of a defendant without his consent violates due process. In 
the present case, it is said, such force consisted of puncturing 
her skin with a needle to withdraw blood. But even if the 
decision does not condemn all forcible taking of real evidence, 
the argument continues, it precludes the use of any which is 
obtained by a forcible entry into the defendant's body. 
The court in the Rochin case approved prior decisions 
which declare that due process, as that term is used in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, does not embody all of the rights 
enumerated in the first eight amendments, but only those 
immunities which are "so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental'' or 
are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." (P. 169.) 
That the privilege against self-incrimination is not one 
of the immunities implicit in due process was decided iu 
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 [29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97], 
and reaffirmed in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 [67 
S.Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223]. However, the 
privilege is guaranteed by the Constitution of this state, which 
declares that " [ n] o person shall . . . be compelled, in any 
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case, to be a witness against himself.'' (Cal. Const., 
art. I, § 13.) [1] Reviewing the scope and purpose of that 
provision, this court said in People v. Trujillo, 32 Cal.2d 
105 [194 P.2d 681]: "Wigmore, in an exhaustive and scholarly 
discussion of the history and policy behind the provision of 
the federal Constitution, which is substantially the same as 
the California mandate, concludes that the object of the pro-
tection 'is the employment of legal process to extract from 
the person's own lips an admission of his guilt, which will 
thus take the place of other evidence. . . . 
'' 'In other words, it is not merely any and every com-
pulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, in history and in 
the constitutional definitions, but testimonial compulsion.' " 
(P. 112.) 
This statement of the rule is consistent with that of the 
United States Supreme Court (Holt v. United States, 218 
U.S. 245 [31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 1021] ; United States v. White, 
322 U.S. 694 [64 S.Ct. 1248, 88 L.Ed. 1542, 152 A.L.R. 1202]) 
and the courts of other jurisdictions which, in analogous 
factual situations, have concluded there was no violation of 
the privilege. (State v. Green, 121 S.C. 230 [114 S.E. 317] 
[placing defendant's foot in footprint found at scene of 
crime]; State v. McLaughlin, 138 La. 958 [70 So. 925] 
[scrapings taken from beneath accused's fingernails] ; Biggs 
v. State, 201 Ind. 200 [167 N.E. 129, 64 A.L.R. 1085] [re-
moving defendant's shoes to match footprints]; State v. 
Aspara, 113 La. 940 [37 So. 883] [removing defendant's cloth-
ing for comparisons and tests] ; Ash v. State, 139 Tex.Crim. 
Rep. 420 [141 S.W.2d 341] [giving accused an enema to re-
cover swallowed jewelry]; United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 
[taking fingerprints of accused] ; see anno. 164 A.L.R. 967; 
Inbau, Self Incrimination [1950].) 
[2] Evidence is not obtained by testimonial compulsion 
where it consists of a test of blood taken from an accused. 
It is not a communication from the accused but real evidence 
of the ultimate fact in issue-the defendant's physical con-
dition. (State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577 [160 P.2d 283, 289, 
164 A.L.R. 952] ; State v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99 [70 A.2d 
909, 911-912] ; State v. Ayres, 70 Idaho 18 [211 P.2d 142, 
144] ; State v. Alexander, 7 N.J. 585 [83 A.2d 441, 445]; 
Block . v. People, 125 Colo. 36 [240 P.2d 512, 515-516], 
cert. den. 343 U.S. 978 [72 S.Ct. 1076, 96 L.Ed. 1370].) 
41 C.2d-9 
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[3] Similarly, real evidence obtained from a defendant's 
~tomach by use of an emetic is not violative of the privilege 
against self-incrimination. Despite contrary suggestions, the 
majority of the court in the Rochin case did not rest its re-
versal of the conviction upon that ground. (See the concurring 
opinions of Justices Black and Douglas, 342 U.S. 165, 174, 
177.) Nor did the court overrule or limit earlier cases which 
define the scope of the privilege or exclude that privilege from 
the operation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Accordingly, no changes in the rules stated and 
applied in those cases may be presumed. 
More pertinent to the present inquiry is the prohibition 
against unlawful searches and seizures stated in the Fourth 
Amenrlment to the federal Constitution and in tile Cahfornta 
Constitution. (Art.--±, § 19.) In Wolf v:-fJvlvrado, 338 U.S. 
~1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782], the applicability of the 
llue process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to that pro-
hibition was considered. Freedom from unlawful intrusion 
was held to be basic to a free society and, being implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty, enforceable against the states 
through the due process clause. 
In prosecutions in the federal courts, an accused may, 
upon timely motion, obtain an order suppressing evidence ob-
tained from him unlawfully. But the court in the vV olf case 
expressly stated that this method of enforcement is not obliga-
tory upon the states. Recognizing that the primary effect of 
such a remedy is to protect the person incriminated by such 
evidence, in opposition to the interests of society in the de-
tection and punishment of criminal acts, the court said: ''We 
cannot ... regard it as a departure from basic standards 
to remand such persons, together with those who emerge 
scatheless from a search, to the remedies of private action 
and such protection as the internal discipline of the police, 
under the eyes of an alert public opinion, may afford. Grant-
ing that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effec-
, tive way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for 
this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal standards 
assured by the Due Process Clause a State's reliance upon 
other methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally 
effective." (P. 31.) 
[ 4] Without deviation, this court has held that competent 
evidence, although improperly obtained, is admissible in a 
criminal prosecution against the person from whom the evi-
dence is taken. (People v. Kelley, 22 Cal.2d 169, 172 [137 
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P.2d 1] ; People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal.2d 165, 169 (124 P.2d 
44] ; People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237 [205 P. 435, 24 .A.L.R. 
1383].) 
Elements of unlawfulness in the acquisition of evidence 
were present in the Rochin case, the initial entry and search 
being without the authority of a warrant. However, the 
basis for the decision is not that the evidence was acquired 
illegally. Reversal of the judgment upon that ground would 
have been contrary to the Wolf case, and it is not to be 
supposed that the Supreme Court would make such a startling 
change in constitutional doctrine without mention of that 
decision. 
The essence of the Rochin decision is in the court's refer-
ence to Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 [56 S.Ct. 461, 80 
L.Ed. 682], and other coerced confession cases. In the Brown 
case, a conviction based upon a confession obtained by torture 
was reversed because such a practice amounted to a wrong 
"so fundamental that it made the whole proceeding a mere 
pretense of a trial and rendered the conviction and sentence 
wholly void." (P. 286.) So, in the Rochin case, the court 
said: "Use of involuntary verbal confessions in State criminal 
trial~ is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of their 
unreliability. They are inadmissible under the Due Process 
Clause even though statements contained in them may be in-
dependently established as true. Coerced confessions offend 
the community's sense of fair play and decency. So here, 
to sanction the brutal conduct which naturally enough was 
condemned by the court whose judgment is before us, would 
be to afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be 
more calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize 
the temper of a society." (Pp. 173-17 4.) In brief, the 
Rochin case holds that brutal or shocking force exerted to 
acquire evidence renders void a conviction based wholly or in 
part upon the use of such evidence. 
Contrary to Mrs. Haeussler's contention, the Rochin decision 
does not rest upon the premise that the taking of evidence 
from the person of a defendant or by entry into his body 
is the decisive factor. Instead, the entire course of conduct 
was examined and found to be brutal and shocking. The 
court disclaimed any intent to fix rigidly the confines of due 
process by asserting that they must remain "indefinite and 
vague.'' 'fhat blood tests and similar techniques may stand 
against constitutional objection is suggested by the state-
ment: "We therefore put to one side cases which have arisen 
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in State courts through use of modern methods and devices 
· for discovering wrongdoers and bringing them to book. It 
does not fairly represent these decisions to suggest that they 
legalize force so brutal and so offensive to human dignity in 
~ecuring evidence from a suspect as is revealed by this record.'' 
(P. 174.) 
[5] The taking of a blood test, when accomplished in a 
medically approved manner, does not smack of brutality. In 
recent years, millions of young men have been subjected to 
such tests as an incident to induction into military service. 
In this state, a blood test is required of each person making 
application for a marriage license (Civ. Code, § 79.01) and 
,physicians engaged in prenatal care of a pregnant woman, 
or attending such woman at the time of delivery, must obtain 
a sample of her blood for purposes of a test for venereal 
disease. (Health & Saf. Code, § 21402.) Moreover, in the 
present case, Mrs. Haeussler was unconscious at the time 
the blood was withdrawn, and the removal of four of the five 
cubic centimeters was necessary to provide medical treat-
ment. The only unauthorized action of the medical attendant 
was to remove one additional cubic centimeter of blood after 
the hypodermic needle already had been inserted. Certainly, 
this conduct cannot be characterized as shocking to the con-
science, and it does not support Mrs. Haeussler's claim of a 
violation of due process of law. 
Another point relied upon is that the testimony of the 
highway patrolman relative to the point of impact was not 
upon a matter subject to expert testimony and should not 
have been received. [6] But, as was said in Zelayeta v. 
Pacific Greyhound Lines·, 104 Cal.App.2d 716 [232 P.2d 572]: 
q It is quite obvious that the conclusion, based upon the facts 
of a particular case, as to just where a collision between two 
vehicles occurred, may be so obvious that any reasonable 
person, trained or not, can draw that inference from the facts. 
It is equally clear that cases may occur where the opinions of 
trained experts in the field on this subject will be of great 
assistance to the members of the jury in arriving at their 
conclusions. In such cases a traffic officer who has spent 
years investigating accidents in which he has been required 
to render official reports not only as to the facts of the acci-
dents but also as to his opinion as to their causes, including 
his. opinion, when necessary, as to the point of impact, is an 
expert. Necessarily, in this field, much must be left to the 
common sense and discretion of the trial court." (P. 727.) 
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In the present case, the officer's qualifications as a wit-
ness included many years of experience in investigating 
traffic accidents and reporting their causes to his superiors. 
He based his opinion upon an inspection of skid and gouge 
marks on the pavement and the location of oil, broken glass, 
parts of the vehicles, and other debris. The trial court was 
justified in concluding that a determination, from these indicia, 
as to the point of impact might properly be made by an expert. 
[7] It is also argued that the trial court committed prej-
udicial error in permitting the prosecution's witness, a me-
chanic, to give opinion testimony relative to a broken speedome-
ter on the Lovelace car. This testimony was in response to 
evidence offered by Mrs. Haeussler tending to prove that, after 
the accident, the speedometer was broken and its needle 
fixed at a point indicating a speed of 78 miles per hour. The 
mechanic testified that a severe impact might cause the 
needle to become fixed at any point, regardless of the speed 
at which the car had been traveling. 
This witness was qualified as an expert by evidence that 
he had been a speedometer mechanic for several years. No 
attempt was made by counsel for Mrs. Haeussler to cross-
examine him concerning his qualifications nor was any request 
made to take the witness on voir dire. [8] Generally, it 
is for the trial court to determine the competency and quali-
fication of a witness to state an opinion, and upon appeal its 
ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a manifest 
showing of abuse of discretion. (Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 
Cal.2d 465, 476 [234 P.2d 34] .) None was shown here. 
[9] Objection is made to the definition of "under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor'' given in instructions to the 
jury. They were told that it was unnecessary to find that 
Mrs. Haeussler was "drunk" or "intoxicated"; it would be 
sufficient if it were found that intoxicating liquor had "so 
far affected the nervous system, brain or muscles as to impair 
to an appreciable degree the ability to operate the vehicle 
in a manner like that of an ordinarily prudent and cautious 
person in the full possession of his faculties, using reasonable 
care and under like conditions.'' The degree to which a 
person must be influenced by alcohol to warrant a conviction 
under section 501 of the Vehicle Code is correctly stated in 
the instruction. (People v. Dingle, 56 Cal.App. 445, 449 
(205 P. 705] .) 
Several cases are relied upon by Mrs. Haeussler for the 
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proposition that "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" 
is synonymous with "intoxicated." (People v. Dingle, supra; 
Taylor v. Joyce, 4 Cal.App.2d 612 [41 P.2d 967]; People v. 
Lewis, 4 Cal.App.2d Supp. 775 [37 P.2d 752] .) She argues 
that it was error to instruct otherwise. 
In the Dingle case, an instruction defining a violation of 
section 17 of the Motor Vehicle Act (Stats. 1919, p. 214) 
was challenged because of the asserted failure to define ''in-
toxication.'' Rejecting that contention, the court said: ''The 
statute does not say that no person shall operate or drive a 
motor vehicle on the public highway while 'intoxicated,' 
but that no person shall operate or drive such a vehicle on 
the public highway while 'under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor.' The instruction, therefore, very properly does not 
undertake to define 'intoxication,' but does state what acts 
and what condition will justify a finding that the accused 
is 'under the influence of intoxicating liquor,' within the 
meaning of the statute." (P. 452.) 
As a dictum, the court went on to say: "It is probably true, 
however, that the phrase 'under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor' is, substantially and to all practical intents and pur-
poses, synonymous with such words as 'intoxication' and 
'drunkenness.' But even so, the instruction gives a good 
definition of 'intoxication.' In St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. 
Waters, 105 Ark. 619 [152 S.W. 137], the Arkansas supreme 
court defined intoxication, or drunkenness, substantially 
in accord with the definition given in this instruction. In 
that case the court said: 'A man may be said to be drunk 
whenever he is under the influence of intoxicating liquors 
to the extent that they affect his acts or conduct so that 
persons coming in contact with him could readily see and 
know that the intoxicating liquors were affecting him in 
that respect'.'' (P. 452.) 
This dictum was the basis for holdings in the Taylor and 
Lewis cases. Insofar as these decisions hold that a person 
who is intoxicated also is under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor they are correct. ( Cf. Tracy v. Brecht, 3 Cal.App.2d 
105, 114 [39 P.2d 498].) [10] It is generally recognized, 
however, that persons may be "under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor'' within the meaning of statutes similar to sec-
tion 501 of the Vehicle Code without being affected to 
the extent commonly associated with ''intoxication'' or 
"drunkenness." (See note 142 A.L.R. 555, 561; consistent 
with this view are People v. Ekstromer, 71 Cal.App. 239 
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[235 P. 69]; People v. McKee, 80 Cal. App. 200 [251 P. 675]; 
In re Ryan, 61 Cal.App.2d 310 [142 P.2d 769].) To the 
extent that they indicate a contrary holding, Taylor v. Joyce, 
supra, and People v. Lewis, supra, are disapproved. 
[11] In another instruction, the jury were charged that 
Mrs. Haeussler was ''under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor'' if, having consumed alcoholic liquor ''in any amount 
whatsoever,'' she was so affected that she acted ''differently 
from an ordinarily prudent person under similar circum-
stances.'' She reads this instruction as permitting the jury 
to find a violation of the statute as a result of her inability 
to perform acts other than the safe driving of an automobile. 
However, the instruction was prefaced with words relating 
to the driving of a vehicle and preceded by an instruction 
stating that her ability to operate a vehicle must have been 
impaired. Read in context, the instruction could not have 
confused the jury. 
[12] Nor is there merit to the contention that the court 
committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct the jury 
that Mrs. Haeussler should be acquitted if the accident were 
unavoidable or if it were found that the accident was caused 
solely by the negligence of Lovelace. The jurors were told 
that, to convict Mrs. Haeussler, they must find misconduct 
by her to have been the cause of death; also, the occurrence 
of an accident did not warrant an inference of negligence. 
There was no legal requirement that the court expressly 
negative liability in the event that either of these contin-
gencies occurred. (People v. Rodgers, 94 Cal.App.2d 166, 
168 [210 P.2d 71] .) 
The record fails to sustain the charge of bias on the part 
of the trial judge. The alleged misconduct consists of isolated 
instances among a great number of procedural rulings, many 
of which were adverse to the prosecution. No favoritism 
to either party is shown. 
No other assignments of error require discussion. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree that the admission of testimony concerning 
the results of the blood test taken without defendant's con-
sent was not a denial of due process. Defendant was uncon-
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scions when the blood sample was taken by the insertion of a 
hypodermic needle. This necessitated the use of force, how-
ever slight, and was an invasion of the privacy of her body. 
It may be admitted that the force used here was not so 
brutal or shocking as that used in People v. Rochin, 101 Cal. 
App.2d 140, 143 [225 P.2d 1, 913] ; Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165 [72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396], but 
it still remains that force was used on the body of a person 
unable to protect herself, or even to remonstrate against the 
use of such force. 
The illustrations used by the majority to demonstrate that 
the taking of blood tests, in a medically approved manner, 
do not ''smack'' of brutality, are not persuasive. First, it is 
suggested that millions of young· men have been subjected 
to such tests as an incident to induction into military service, 
that blood tests are required of those applying for a marriage 
license, of pregnant women during prenatal care, or prior 
to their delivery. Not one of these groups was accused of a 
crime-not one of them was composed of unconscious persons. 
All of them had a choice-that of compliance or refusal. De-
fendant here had no such choice. A sample of blood was 
taken from her while in an unconscious state and the results 
of that test were given in evidence against her. In my opinion, 
this violates her personal guarantee, not only of due process 
of law, as guaranteed by both Constitutions, but of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination found in the California Con-
stitution. 
Any evidence obtained illegally, and it was certainly as 
illegally obtained here as if obtained by reason of the search 
of a person or a home without a search warrant, is in my 
opinion inadmissible in evidence. I have long been in favor 
of legislation designed to make such evidence inadmissible in 
all the courts of this state so that personal privacy may be 
protected as it was intended to be protected by the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 
section 19 of article I of the Constitution of California. 
In my opinion, the forcible taking of blood for the purpose 
of making a blood test to use in evidence against that person 
''shocks the conscience . . . and is bound to offend even 
hardened sensibilities. '!'hey are methods too close to the 
rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.'' 
(Rochin v. California, supra, at p. 172.) To take blood from 
an unconscious person for the purpose of saving that person's 
life is justified only on the ground of the humanitarian pur-
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pose involved; to take it for the purpose of making out a 
case against that person is something else again. 
As Mr. Justice Jackson said (United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 
581 [68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210]) our forefathers, "after 
consulting the lessons of history, designed our Constitution 
to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police sur-
veillance, which they seemed to think was a greater danger 
to a free people than the escape of some criminals from 
punishment.'' I agree with this concept and believe that it 
delineates the line of demarcation between the American way 
of life and what we are told may be expected under a totali-
tarian regime. 
Because I believe in the dignity and security of the in-
dividual and agree with the framers of the Bill of Rights 
that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures," should "not be violated," (emphasis added) I can-
not sanction the conduct of the prosecution officers in this 
case, and would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied July 28, 
1953. 
[L. A. No. 22300. In Bank. July 14, 1953.] 
AI .. BERT YORBA et al., Appellants, v. ANAHEIM UNION 
WATER COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Respondents. 
[1] Adverse Possession- Continuity of Possession- By Suit.-
While ordinarily the filing of an action, either b:v nerson 
asserting a prescriptive right or by person against whom tho 
statute of limitations is running, w~ll interrupt running of 
prescriptive period and statute will be tolled while action is 
actively pending, an action that has been dismissed or aban-
doned does not interrupt running of prescriptive period. 
[1] Time covered by pendency of suit discontinued without de-
cision on merits as included in computation of period of adverse 
possession, note, 80 A.L.R. 439. See, also, Oal.Jur.2d, Adverse 
Possession, § 60; Am.Jur., Adverse Possession, § 180 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Adverse Possession,§ 82; [2] Waters, 
§ 120; [3] Waters,§ 730; [4, 5] Waters, § 737(7). 
